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By	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  December	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  INTRODUCTION	  	  This	   paper	   looks	   at	   the	   specific	   proposed	   amendments	   to	   European	   directive	  2007/36/EC	  and	  2013/34/EU,	  and	  evaluates	  as	  to	  how	  such	  amendments	  alter	  shareholders’	   moral	   responsibilities.	   	   To	   be	   responsible	   is	   here	   simply	   to	   be	  understood	  as	  being	  under	  an	  obligation,	  where	  an	  obligation	   is	  a	  requirement	  on	   an	   agent	   to	   either	   act	   or	   refrain	   from	   acting	   in	   a	   given	   way.	   In	   order	   to	  determine	  whether	  changes	  to	  the	  proposed	  directives	  alter	  shareholders’	  moral	  responsibilities	   the	   following	   analysis	   argues	   that	   we	   need	   to	   look	   at	   three	  factors:	  whether	  such	  changes	  do	  in	  fact	  alter	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  shareholders’	  obligations,	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  agent	  i.e.	  shareholders	  to	  whom	  the	  obligation	  is	  to	  apply	  and	  thirdly	  whether	  they	  do	  actually	  apply.	  	  	  	  Section	  one	  of	  this	  paper	  introduces	  the	  reader	  to	  the	  proposed	  amendments	  by	  the	  European	  Commission	  and	  the	  UK	  Governments	  proposals.	  It	  also	  introduces	  the	   two	   specific	   ratios	   that	  will	   be	   analyzed	   in	   greater	  detail,	   namely	   the	   ratio	  between	  the	  lowest	  and	  highest	  paid	  in	  the	  corporate,	  and	  the	  ratio	  between	  the	  fixed	  and	  variable	  parts	  of	  senior	  management	  remuneration.	  	  	  What	  an	  obligation	  is	  and	  particularly	  what	  a	  moral	  obligation	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  is	  presented	   in	  section	   two	  with	   the	   focus	  being	  on	  G.	  E.	  M.	  Anscombe’s	  and	  S.	  Wolf’s	  discussions	  on	  command	  theories	  and	  the	  force	  needed	  to	  turn	  something	  from	  being	  morally	  required	  to	  being	  a	  moral	  obligation.	  	  	  More	   specific	   differences	   between	   the	   European	   and	   the	   UK	   proposals	   are	  discussed	  in	  section	  three.	  This	  is	  relevant	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  what	  it	  is	  that	  the	  two	  authorities	  hope	  to	  achieve	  from	  the	  proposed	  amendments,	  and	  also	  the	  different	  approaches	  as	   to	  what	   the	  role	  of	  shareholders	  have	  been	  and	  should	  be	   going	   forward.	   Here	   I	   also	   draw	   on	   statements	   by	   politicians	   to	   form	   a	  stronger	  picture	  of	  the	  two	  perspectives.	  	  	  Combining	  the	  discussion	  on	  moral	  command	  theories	  and	   looking	  deeper	   into	  the	   two	  proposed	  ratios	  allows	   for	  an	  analysis	  as	   to	  how	  these	   two	  ratios	  may	  effect	   what	   is	   perceived	   to	   be	   the	   changed	  moral	   obligations	   of	   shareholders.	  Such	  an	  analysis	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  section	  four.	  	  	  Yet	   this	   in	   itself	   is	   not	   sufficient	   to	   say	   that	   moral	   obligations	   in	   fact	   have	  changed.	   This	   cannot	   be	   determined	   before	   looking	   at	   what	   it	   means	   to	   be	   a	  shareholder	  (section	  five)	  and	  whether	  such	  moral	  obligations	  can	  truly	  be	  said	  to	  apply	  to	  such	  shareholders	  (section	  six).	  	  	  My	  conclusion,	  which	  is	  presented	  in	  section	  seven,	  states	  that	  there	  are	  in	  fact	  changes	   to	   shareholder	   moral	   obligations	   and	   as	   such	   changes	   to	   their	   moral	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responsibilities.	   However,	   what	   the	   changes	   are	   depends	   on	   what	   type	   of	  shareholder	   we	   look	   at.	   Institutional	   shareholders	   responsibilities	   are	   altered	  more	   than	   small	   private	   shareholders	   by	   virtue	   of	   having	   more	   control	   of	  corporate	  boards	  and	  existing	  moral	  obligations	  to	  their	  clients	  and	  beneficiaries	  as	   stated	   by	   the	   UK	   Stewardship	   Code	   and	   the	   EFAMA	   Code	   for	   External	  Governance.	   Furthermore,	   I	   go	   on	   to	   show	   that	   given	   that	   the	   definition	   of	  shareholders	   significantly	   depends	   on	   the	   formal	   agreements	   between	   the	  relationship	   shareholders	   have	   to	   corporates,	   and	   in	   the	   case	   of	   institutional	  shareholders	   to	   their	   investors,	   any	   considerable	   changes	   to	   their	   rights	   or	  obligations	  in	  fact	  changes	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  shareholder.	  	  1.	  AMENDMENTS	  TO	  THE	  SHAREHOLDER	  RIGHTS	  DIRECTIVE	  	  On	  the	  9th	  of	  April	  2014,	   the	  European	  Commission	  announced	  amendments	  to	  directive	   2007/36/EC	   and	   2013/34/EU	   in	   regards	   to	   long-­‐term	   shareholder	  engagement	   (2014	   European	   Commission).	   	   Such	   amendments	   include	   the	  introduction	   of	   mandatory	   and	   binding	   shareholder	   voting	   on	   corporate	   pay	  (2014	  Press	  Release,	  European	  Commission).	  	  	  The	   reason	   for	   introducing	   such	   changes	   were	   said	   to	   be	   found	   in	   the	   recent	  economic	  crisis,	  where	  shareholders	  were	  too	  often	  shown	  to	  support	  managers’	  excessive	   short-­‐term	   risk	   taking	   and	   further	   did	   not	   sufficiently	   monitor	   the	  companies	  they	  invested	  in	  (2014	  Press	  Release,	  European	  Commission	  ).	  	  	  In	   a	   statement	   Michel	   Barnier	   (2012	   John	   O'Donnell),	   the	   European	  Commissioner	  in	  charge	  of	  regulation,	  further	  expressed	  that:	  There	  is	  mounting	  public	  anger	  at	  the	  widening	  gap	  between	  earnings	  of	  bankers	   and	   business	   executives	   and	   ordinary	   workers	   when	   many	  European	  economies	  are	  in	  recession	  and	  unemployment	  is	  high.	  To	   encourage	   shareholder	   engagement	   and	   participation	   to	   control	   excessive	  short-­‐term	  risk	  taking	  by	  managers	  and	  adjusting	  the	  widening	  gap	  in	  earnings,	  the	   European	   Commission	   are	   looking	   at	   two	   proposed	   ratios	   (2012	   John	  O'Donnell)	  on	  which	  shareholders	  are	  to	  be	  made	  to	  make	  a	  decision	  on	  namely;	  the	   ratio	   between	   the	   lowest	   and	   highest	   paid	   in	   the	   corporate,	   and	   the	   ratio	  between	  the	  fixed	  and	  variable	  parts	  of	  the	  remuneration.	  	  Neither	  is	  the	  European	  Commission	  alone	  in	  looking	  at	  such	  amendments	  to	  shareholder	  voting	  rights.	  In	  January	  2012,	  the	  UK	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Business,	  Innovation	  and	  Skills	  announced	  a	  package	  of	  measures	  to	  address	  failings	  in	  the	  corporate	  governance	  framework	  for	  executive	  remuneration	  (2012	  Department	  for	  Business	  Innovation	  and	  Skills).	  Such	  measures	  including	  empowering	  shareholders	  and	  promoting	  shareholder	  engagement	  through	  enhanced	  voting	  rights.	  	  	  1.1 THE	  MATTERS	  AT	  STAKE	  	  	  By	   reviewing	   the	   two	   proposed	   ratios	   the	   European	   Commission	   are	  investigating	  whether	  to	  increase	  shareholder	  engagement	  in	  two	  very	  separate	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matters.	   One,	   as	   mentioned	   above,	   is	   the	   excessive	   short-­‐term	   risk	   taking	   by	  corporate	   managers,	   and	   the	   other	   seemingly	   the	   widening	   earnings	   gap	   in	  corporates.	  	  1.1.1	  RESPONSIBILITY	  FOR	  EXCESSIVE	  SHORT	  TERM	  RISK	  	  A	  ratio	  between	  the	  fixed	  and	  variable	  parts	  of	  the	  remuneration	  directly	  relates	  to	   excessive	   short-­‐term	   risk	   taken	   by	   corporate	  managers.	  Whereby	   fixed	   and	  variable	  parts	  of	   remuneration	  are	  used	  as	  a	   tool	   to	  motivate	  specific	  behavior	  and	   actions	   amongst	   corporate	   managers.	   By	   introducing	   a	   mandatory	   and	  binding	   shareholder	   vote	   on	   such	   a	   ratio	   the	   European	   Commission	   are	  extending	   shareholders’	   legal	   responsibilities	   and	   rights	   to	   include	   that	   of	  controlling	   excessive	   short-­‐term	   risk.	   Shareholders	   here	   come	   under	   extended	  responsibility	  simply	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  vote	  on	  the	  specific	  ration	  becoming	  legally	  mandatory.	   	   They	  will	   be	   seen	   as	   fulfilling	   their	   legal	   responsibilities	   provided	  they	  vote.	  	  Whether	   the	   amendment	   leads	   to	   any	  extended	  moral	   responsibility	   is	  not	   yet	  clear.	  The	  moral	   responsibility	  angle	  seemingly	  being	  something	   in	   the	  specific	  shape	  of;	  	  	  ‘Shareholders	   ought	   control	   excessive	   short-­‐term	   risk	   taking	   by	   corporate	  managers	  working	  for	  corporates	  in	  which	  they	  invest’.	  	  The	  basic	  assumption	  being	  that	  excessive	  short-­‐term	  risk	  taking	  is	  something	  to	  be	  avoided.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  shareholders	  alone	  are	  to	  be	  held	  responsible	  in	  case	  of	  shortcomings,	  but	  they	  clearly	  share	  this	  responsibility.	  	  	  What	  makes	  this	  specifically	   interesting	   in	  not	  simply	  whether	  excessive	  short-­‐term	  risk	  taking	   is	  viewed	  as	  something	  morally	  wrong,	  something	  that	  will	  be	  addressed	   in	   a	   future	   paper,	   but	   what	   type	   of	   risk	   the	   European	   commission	  might	  be	  referring	  to.	  	  	  One	  type	  of	  risk	  could	  simply	  refer	  to	  the	  increased	  operational	  risk.	  This	  would	  be	  an	  area	  that	  few	  would	  object	  to	  the	  shareholder	  having	  some	  form	  of	  control	  and	  engagement	  in,	  as	  it	  directly	  relates	  to	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  firm.	  However,	  by	  associating	  the	  need	  for	  changes	  to	  the	  directive	  with	  ‘the	  wider	  financial	  crisis’	  (2012	   Press	   Release,	   European	   Commission)	   and	   ‘public	   anger’	   (2012	   John	  O'Donnell)	   the	  commission	  seems	   to	  be	   implying	   that	   there	   is	  a	   further	   risk	   to	  the	   society	   as	   a	   whole	   that	   needs	   to	   be	   taken	   into	   account.	   The	   concept	   that	  shareholders	  are	  morally	  responsible	   for	   this	   further	  risk	  to	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  will	  face	  wider	  objection	  in	  the	  form	  of	  for	  example	  Milton	  Friedman	  (Friedman	  1970)	  and	  his	  view	  on	  the	  social	  role	  of	  business.	  	  	  Yet,	   the	   lack	   of	   clarity	   as	   to	   whether	   shareholder	   moral	   responsibilities	   have	  been	  extended	  does	  not	  solemnly	  find	  its	  roots	  in	  the	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  the	  type	  of	   risk	   that	   is	   at	   stake.	   As	  will	   be	   discussed	   in	   great	   detail	   in	   section	   two	   and	  beyond.	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1.1.2	   RESPONSIBILITY	   FOR	   CONTROLING	   THE	   WIDENING	   EARNINGS	   CAP	   IN	  CORPORATES	  	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  mandatory	  and	  binding	  vote	  for	  shareholders	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  ratio	  between	   the	   lowest	   and	   highest	   paid	   in	   a	   corporate	   potentially	   has	   a	   greater	  impact	  on	  shareholders	  and	  their	  responsibilities.	  Even	  though	  the	  proposal	  only	  mandates	  shareholders	  to	  vote	  on	  a	  ratio	  as	  proposed	  by	  corporate	  management,	  this	  is	  not	  an	  area	  traditionally	  seen	  as	  coming	  under	  the	  remit	  of	  shareholders.	  The	  ratio	  between	  the	  lowest	  and	  highest	  paid	  in	  a	  corporate	  comes	  more	  under	  the	   topic	  of	   social	   fairness	  and	   justice,	   rather	   than	  best	  practice	   in	  a	   corporate	  governance	  sense.	  Such	  a	  topic	  is	  surely	  seen	  to	  come	  under	  the	  responsibilities	  of	   politicians	   and	   legislators	   rather	   than	   investors.	   Is	   it	   then	   possible	   for	  shareholders	   to	   be	   bound	   by	   such	   responsibilities,	   and	   would	   such	   a	   bind	  necessitate	  us	  to	  change	  our	  perception	  on	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  a	  shareholder?	  	  	  2.	  OBLIGATIONS	  AND	  THEIR	  ROLE	  IN	  RESPONSIBILITY	  	  To	  hold	  an	  agent	  responsible	  is	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  this	  paper	  equivalent	  of	  viewing	  an	  agent	   to	  be	  under	  an	  obligation.	  An	  obligation	  being	  a	   course	  of	   action	   that	  one	  is	  required	  or	  bound	  to	  take,	  given	  the	  acceptance	  of	  a	  set	  code	  or	  standard.	  In	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  European	  Commission’s	  proposed	  alterations	  to	   the	   shareholder	   rights	   directive	   alters	   shareholders’	   moral	   responsibilities	  this	   section	   will	   look	   at	   the	   concepts	   of	   obligation	   in	   general	   and	   of	   moral	  obligation	   in	  more	  detail.	  What	   is	  meant	  by	  an	  agent	   to	  be	  under	  an	  obligation	  will	   be	   discussed	   further	   in	   section	   four.	   For	   now	   I	   will	   simply	   provide	   the	  following	  definition:	  	   Agent	  A	  is	  under	  the	  obligation	  to	  B,	  where	  to	  B	  is	  to	  act	  or	  refrain	  from	  acting	   in	   a	   given	   way,	   given	   that	   agent	   A	   exist,	   that	   there	   exists	   an	  obligation	  to	  B	  and	  furthermore	  the	  obligation	  to	  B	  necessarily	  applies	  to	  agent	  A.	  	  	  The	  word	  obligation	  has	  its	  origin	  in	  the	  Latin	  ‘obligare’,	  deriving	  from	  the	  root	  ‘lig’,	  meaning	  tie	  or	  bind.	  The	  term	  was	   first	   found	  to	  be	  used	   in	  Plautus'	   (254-­‐184BC)	   play	   Truculentus	   	   (Zimmerman	   1:1996).	   The	   play	   describing	   the	  prostitute	   Phronesium’s	   relentless	   manipulation	   of	   all	   men.	   The	   concept	   of	  obligation	  was	  first	  introduced	  into	  early	  Roman	  law	  as	  a	  means	  for	  the	  state	  to	  overcome	  the	  common	  practice	  whereby	  a	  wronged	  party	  would	  be	  entitled	  to	  privately	  execute	  his	  punishment	  on	  a	  wrongdoer.	  Such	  punishment	  more	  often	  than	  not	  ending	  up	  in	  the	  wrongdoer’s	  death.	  	  Instead,	  obligation	  law	  enabled	  the	  state	   to	   force	   the	   wronged	   party	   to	   accept	   financial	   compensation	   for	   wrong.	  Hence,	  the	  earlier	  concept	  of	  obligation	  included	  a	  party	  that	  was	  under	  duty	  to	  pay	  and	  a	  party	  that	  had	  a	  right	  to	  claim	  compensation.	   If	   the	  wrongdoer	  were	  unable	   to	   pay	   then	   he	  would	   come	   to	   belong	   to	   the	  wronged	   party,	   usually	   in	  form	  of	  a	  slave	  (Zimmerman	  6:1996).	  The	  slave	  being	  bound	  in	  chains,	  hence	  the	  term	  ‘obligare’.	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Obligations	  come	  in	  a	  multitude	  of	  forms;	  legal,	  moral,	  social,	  political	  etc.	  What	  predominantly	   sets	   them	   apart	   is	   the	   set	   code	   or	   standards	   on	   which	   they	  depend	  to	  enforce	  the	  requirement	  to	  act	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another.	  When	  looking	  at	  obligations	  I	  adapt	  a	  legal	  frame	  of	  mind	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  I	  view	  it	  as	  a	  voluntary	  or	   involuntary	   contract	   containing	   the	   following	   three;	   an	   obligatoriness	   i.e.	   a	  subject	  matter,	  an	  oblige	  i.e.	  an	  agent	  who	  is	  said	  to	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  perform	  and	  a	  defined	  bond	  that	  connects	  the	  agent	  to	  the	  obligation.	  This	  is	  more	  in	  line	  with	  English	  common	   law,	  where	   there	   is	  no	  place	   for	  a	  party	   that	  has	  rights	  unlike	  Roman	  law	  (Zimmerman	  10:1996).	   For	   the	  sake	  of	   this	  paper	  we	  are	   looking	  at	  a	  situation	  where	  a	  political	  body,	  namely	  the	  European	  Commission,	  is	  making	  an	  alteration	  to	  shareholders	  legal	  obligations	   by	   way	   of	   amending	   the	   shareholders	   rights	   directive.	   The	   main	  question	  being	  whether	  this	  effects	  shareholders’	  moral	  obligations.	  In	  order	  to	  deal	  with	  this	  question	  it	  is	  right	  to	  start	  with	  explaining	  what	  a	  moral	  obligation	  is.	  	  	  2.1	  MORAL	  OBLIGATION	  	  	  Moral	  philosophy	   tends	   to	   look	  at	  moral	  standards	  as	  reasons	   for	  action	  (Pink,	  6th	  Dec	  2002).	  The	  idea	  being	  that	  for	  something	  to	  be	  morally	  commendable	  is	  in	   itself	   a	   justification	   for	   action.	  However,	  moral	   standards	   go	   beyond	   that	   of	  simply	  being	  reasons	  or	  justifications	  for	  actions	  in	  that	  they	  also	  come	  with	  the	  obligation	   to	   perform	   them.	   We	   are	   bound	   by	   our	   moral	   obligation	   to	   act	   or	  refrain	  from	  acting	  in	  a	  given	  way.	  	  	  Let	  us	   take	   the	   ten	   commandments	   as	   an	   example	   instructing	  us	   to	   remember	  the	   Sabbath	   and	   respecting	   our	   parents,	   while	   refraining	   from	   idolatry,	  blasphemy,	  murder,	   theft,	   dishonesty,	   and	   adultery.	   	   These	   instructions	   are	   to	  guide	  the	  way	  we	  ought	  to	   live	   in	  virtue	  of	  being	  a	  good	  person.	  A	  virtue	  going	  beyond	  that	  of	  mere	  logical	  requirements	  or	  positive	  law.	  Given	  that	  you	  are	  of	  Jewish	  or	  Christian	  persuasion	  such	  instructions	  are	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  binding	  rules	  rather	   than	   trifling	   guidance.	   Rules	   that	   are	   to	   be	   followed	   irrelevant	   of	  circumstances	  and	  consequences.	  To	  be	  a	  good	  person	  you	  must	  not	  murder	  or	  commit	  adultery.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  not	  only	  that	  you	  must	  not	  murder	  because	  a	  good	  person	  refrains	  from	  such	  actions.	  The	  rule	  is	  further	  enforced	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  God	  who	  has	  instructed	  man	  not	  to	  murder,	  and	  man	  is	  under	  obligation	  to	   follow	  God’s	   instructions.	  Such	  enforcement	   is	   then	  meant	   to	  motivate	  us	   to	  act	  in	  a	  given	  way.	  	  	  Anscombe	   (Anscombe	   1958)	   highlights	   how	   strongly	   such	   a	   Judaic/Christian	  conception	   of	   ethics	   is	   linked	   to	   law.	  Under	   such	   a	   conception	   a	   person	   either	  conforms	   to	   the	   law	  or	   is	   given	   the	   verdict	   of	   being	   a	   bad	  man.	  The	   force	   and	  motivation	   behind	   the	   moral	   obligation	   becomes	   that	   divine	   law	   requires	  conformity.	  Yet,	  for	  such	  divine	  law	  to	  exist	  there	  must	  exist	  a	  divine	  lawmaker	  both	  to	  set	  out	  what	  such	  law	  entails	  and	  to	  function	  as	  a	  motivating	  force.	  Only	  then	   can	   we	   explain	   how	   something	   can	   go	   from	   ‘is’	   to	   ‘ought’	   (Anscombe	  5:1958).	   Anscombe	   here	   draws	   on	   Hume’s	   idea	   that	   truth	   consists	   in	   either	  relations	   of	   ideas	   or	   matters	   of	   fact.	   Let	   us	   take	   the	   moral	   judgment	   that	   ‘to	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murder	   is	   bad’	   as	   an	   example.	   It	   may	   even	   be	   a	   fact	   that	   ‘to	   murder	   is	   bad’	  (something	   Hume	  would	   profusely	   oppose,	   as	   he	   objects	   to	   the	   idea	   of	   moral	  judgments	  being	  facts	  in	  general).	  Let	  us	  then	  see	  this	  fact	  as	  something	  that	  ‘is’.	  However,	   even	   such	   a	   fact	   could	   not	   motivate	   us	   to	   do	   anything	   in	   itself.	   We	  would	  for	  example	  need	  to	  not	  want	  to	  murder	  or	  not	  to	  do	  bad	  in	  order	  for	  such	  a	  fact	  to	  move	  us	  and	  thereby	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  our	  actions.	  Hume	  would	  refer	  to	  such	   a	   motivating	   force	   as	   a	   passion.	   Such	   a	   passion	   would	   fulfill	   one	   of	   the	  requirements	   of	   obligation,	   namely	   that	   it	   provides	   us	   with	   a	   motive	   to	   act.	  Passion	  of	  this	  form	  is	  not	  part	  of	  or	  directly	  related	  to	  the	  fact	  in	  question.	  It	  is	  a	  psychological	  state	  of	  mind.	  Furthermore,	  even	  if	  we	  do	  have	  such	  a	  passion	  to	  move	  us	   into	  action,	   then	  this	  still	  does	  not	  oblige	  us	  to	  do	  something	  –	  the	   ‘is’	  has	  not	  turned	  into	  an	   ‘ought’.	  An	   ‘ought’	  that	  necessarily	  binds	  independent	  of	  circumstances	   and	   consequences,	   which	   is	   the	   second	   requirement	   of	   an	  obligation.	   You	   need	   a	   further	   force	   demanding	   conformity	   a	   divine	   lawmaker	  and	  judge	  to	  fulfill	  all	  the	  requirements	  of	  a	  moral	  requirement.	  	  	  Yet,	   is	   it	   not	   the	   case	   that	   it	   would	   be	   wrong	   to	   murder	   irrelevant	   of	   God’s	  existence?	  Wolf	  (Wolf	  3:2009)	  further	  raises	  the	  question	  whether	  our	  obligation	  not	   to	  murder	   is	   also	   irrelevant	   of	   God	   as	   it	   is	   an	   obligation	  we	   have	   to	   each	  other.	  We	   have	   an	   obligation	   to	   society.	   However,	   the	   same	   challenges	   would	  apply	   if	   we	   wanted	   to	   support	   a	   social	   demand	   theory	   of	   moral	   obligation	  (Adams	   1987)(Wolf	   2009)	   instead	   of	   a	   divine	   demand	   theory.	  We	   would	   still	  need	  to	  show	  that	  there	  exists	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  a	  ‘society’,	  that	  such	  a	  society	  has	  the	  power	  to	  impose	  moral	  obligations	  on	  us,	  and	  that	  we	  can	  know	  what	  these	  are.	  	  	  As	  we	  have	   seen	   from	   the	   above,	  Anscombe	  has	   presented	   a	   concept	   of	  moral	  obligation	  where	   it	   is	   incoherent	   to	   claim	   that	   something	   is	  morally	  obligatory	  unless	   one	   is	   assuming	   that	   one	   is	   obliged	   by	   someone.	   Wolf	   (Wolf	   8-­‐9:2009)	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  different	  approach	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  moral	  obligation,	  where	  she	  defends	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  are	  able	  to	  discern	  what	   is	  morally	  required	  from	  what	   is	   merely	   recommended	   without	   the	   necessary	   existence	   of	   an	   external	  authority.	  	  To	  do	  so	  she	  refers	  to	  the	  form	  in	  which	  we	  blame	  or	  hold	  individuals	  accountable	  for	  their	  actions	  as	  a	  source	  for	  differentiating	  between	  the	  required	  and	  the	  recommended.	  Wolf	  finds	  her	  source	  of	  this	  idea	  in	  the	  following	  quotes	  by	  Mill:	  	   We	   do	   not	   call	   anything	  wrong	   unless	  we	  mean	   to	   imply	   that	   a	   person	  ought	  to	  be	  punished	  in	  some	  way	  or	  other	  for	  doing	  it	  –	  if	  not	  by	  law,	  by	  the	  opinion	  of	  his	  fellow	  creatures;	  if	  not	  by	  opinion,	  by	  the	  reproaches	  of	  his	  own	  conscience.	  (Mill	  47-­‐48:1979)	  	  Followed	  by:	  	   There	  are	  other	   things,	  which	  we	  wish	   that	  people	  should	  do,	  which	  we	  like	   or	   admire	   them	   for	   doing,	   perhaps	   dislike	   or	   despise	   them	   for	   not	  doing,	  but	  yet	  admit	  that	  they	  are	  not	  bound	  to	  do;	  it	  is	  not	  a	  case	  of	  moral	  obligation;	  we	  do	  not	  blame	  them,	   that	   is,	  we	  do	  not	   think	   that	   they	  are	  proper	  objects	  of	  punishment.	  (Mill	  48:1979)	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  However,	   the	   sheer	   notion	   that	   something	   is	  morally	   required	   of	   us,	   need	   not	  equate	  to	  an	  obligation.	  Wolf	  provides	  us	  with	  the	  example	  of	  etiquette	  requires	  us	  to	  pass	  port	  to	  the	  left	  (Wolf	  10:2009).	  	  We	  would	  still	  not	  be	  obliged	  to	  do	  so.	  What	  would	  be	  needed	  in	  order	  for	  there	  to	  be	  some	  obligatory	  bond	  is	  that	  what	  we	  mean	  when	  we	  say	  that	  morality	  requires	  X	  of	  us	  is	  in	  fact	  that	  we	  require	  X	  of	  us.	  This	  brings	  us	  back	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  who	  these	  we	  are.	  	  	  Both	  Wolf	   and	  Adams	   (Adams	   1987)(Wolf	   2009)	   claim	   that	   this	  we	  should	   be	  viewed	  as	  society.	  And	  it	  is	  in	  virtue	  of	  societies	  demands	  that	  a	  morally	  required	  reason	  becomes	  morally	  obligatory	  (Wolf	  16:2009).	  	  This	  is	  also	  the	  stance	  that	  I	  will	  take	  going	  forward	  in	  this	  paper.	  However,	  this	  still	  leaves	  a	  lot	  of	  issues	  to	  be	  dealt	  with,	  such	  as	  the	  need	  to	  know	  what	  society	  accepts	  of	  us	  in	  order	  to	  be	  obliged	  to	  act	  in	  a	  given	  way.	  Furthermore,	  it	  requires	  that	  we	  accept	  that	  society	  has	  this	  force	  and	  an	  understanding	  of	  what	  this	  society	  is.	  These	  challenges	  will	  be	   explored	   in	   more	   detail	   below	   when	   applied	   to	   the	   specific	   case	   of	   the	  European	   commission’s	   recommended	   changes	   to	   the	   shareholder	   rights	  directive.	  	  	  3.	   HOW	   THE	   UK	   APPROACH	   TO	   SHAREHOLDER	   RESPONSIBILITES	   DIFFERS	  FROM	  THE	  EUROPEAN	  APPROACH	  	  The	  European	  framework	  for	  corporate	  governance	  mainly	  consists	  of	  individual	  national	   corporate	   governance	   codes	   and	   the	   Organisation	   for	   Economic	   Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development	  (OECD)	  principles	  for	  corporate	  governance,	  which	  were	  first	  published	  in	  1999.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  this	  paper	  I	  will	  be	  referring	  to	  the	  2004	   OECD	   Principles	   for	   Corporate	   Governance,	   2014	   UK	   Corporate	  Governance	  Code	  and	  2012	  UK	  Stewardship	  Code.	  	  	  What	  the	  three	  have	  in	  common	  is	  that	  they	  are	  principles	  or	  codes	  offering	  non-­‐binding	   standards	   and	   good	   practices	   as	   well	   as	   guidance	   on	   implementation.	  These	   are	   the	   result	   of	   consultations	  with	  minister,	   private	   sector,	   labour,	   and	  civil	   society	   (OECD,	   6:2004).	   Furthermore	   they	   are	   all	   based	   on	   a	   ‘comply	   or	  explain’	  system	  in	  that	  the	  participants	  can	  choose	  to	  divert	  from	  the	  codes	  and	  still	  fulfil	  their	  responsibilities,	  provided	  that	  they	  explain	  why	  they	  have	  chosen	  to	  divert.	  While	  the	  corporate	  governance	  guidance’s	  look	  to	  promote	  principles	  underlying	   an	   effective	   board	   and	   recommendations	   on	   their	   relationship	   to	  shareholders,	  the	  UK	  Stewardship	  Code	  is	  aimed	  at	  guiding	  investors	  on	  how	  to	  better	  exercise	  their	  stewardship	  responsibilities.	  	  	  Yet,	  the	  European	  proposal	  for	  changes	  to	  the	  shareholder	  rights	  directive	  goes	  further	   than	   UK	   recommendations.	   Whereas	   the	   UK	   propose	   mandatory	   and	  binding	   voting	   by	   the	   shareholders,	   they	   do	   not	   go	   as	   far	   as	   requiring	  shareholders	  vote	  on	  the	  ratio	  between	  the	   lowest	  and	  highest-­‐paid	  employees	  in	   the	   corporate	   and	   the	   ratio	   between	   fixed	   and	   variable	   compensation.	  However	  both	  are	  stricter	  than	  the	  regulations	  in	  the	  US	  where	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  financial	   reform	   law	   of	   2010	   requires	   shareholders	   have	   mandatory	   voting	  rights,	  but	  these	  are	  not	  binding,	  i.e.	  corporates	  can	  chose	  to	  ignore	  them.	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This	  difference	  between	  the	  European	  and	  the	  UK	  approach	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  language	  used	  by	  officials.	  Both	  make	  clear	  that	  there	  have	  been	   ‘failings	  in	  the	   corporate	   governance	   framework	   for	   executive	   remuneration’	   (2012	  Department	  for	  Business	  Innovation	  and	  Skills)	  and,	  that	  the	  implementation	  of	  sound	   corporate	   behaviour	   can	   reduce	   the	   damaging	   short-­‐term	   behaviour	  witnessed	   amongst	   European	   corporates.	   	   However	   they	   do	   seem	   to	   differ	   in	  their	  opinion	  as	  to	  what	  role	  shareholders	  have	  played	  in	  causing	  such	  behaviour	  and	  what	  responsibilities	  they	  should	  have	  going	  forward.	  	  	  In	  interviews	  and	  press	  releases	  Michel	  Barnier,	  the	  European	  Commissioner	  has	  been	  quoted	  saying:	  	  Shareholders	  were	   too	  quick	   to	  support	  managers’	  excessive	  short-­‐term	  risk	   taking	   and	   further	   did	   not	   sufficiently	  monitor	   the	   companies	   they	  invested	  in	  (2012	  Press	  Release,	  European	  Commission).	  	  Today's	  proposals	  will	  encourage	  shareholders	   to	  engage	  more	  with	   the	  companies	   they	   invest	   in,	  and	   to	   take	  a	   longer-­‐term	  perspective	  of	   their	  investment	  (2014	  Financial	  Times).	  I	  support	  transparency	  and	  increased	  shareholder	  responsibility	  The	  above	  indicates	  that	  the	  Barnier	  disapproves	  of	  the	  way	  shareholders	  have	  acted	   and	   that	   he	   views	   they	   should	   have	   increased	   responsibilities	   going	  forward.	  This	  is	  not	  the	  tone	  taken	  by	  the	  UK’s	  Business	  Secretary,	  Vince	  Cable.	  He	   instead	  talks	  about	  the	   importance	  of	  empowering	  shareholders	   in	  order	  to	  help	   monitor	   companies	   going	   forward,	   as	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   his	   following	  statements:	  	   These	   proposals	   restore	   a	   clearer,	   stronger	   link	   between	   pay	   and	  performance,	   they	   reduce	   awards	   for	   failures,	   they	   promote	   better	  engagement	   between	   companies	   and	   shareholders	   and	   overall	   they	  empower	   shareholders	   to	   hold	   companies	   to	   account	   through	   binding	  votes	  (2014	  Daily	  Telegraph).	  	   Good	  corporate	  governance	  is	  vital	  to	  creating	  the	  right	  environment	  for	  long-­‐term,	   sustainable	   growth.	   Shareholders	   are	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   UK	  corporate	  governance	   framework,	   so	   it	   is	   appropriate	   that	  we	  put	  more	  information	  and	  power	  in	  their	  hands	  (S	  Tolley	  2012).	  	  Yet	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  UK	  Secretary	  for	  Business	  is	  promoting	  a	  view	  that	  shareholders	  do	  not	  have	  the	  duty	  to	  monitor	  their	  investee	  companies	  or	  should	  not	   play	   a	   role	   in	   corporates’	   remuneration	   policies.	   Both	   are	   made	   clear	   in	  principles	   one	   and	   three	   of	   the	   UK	   Stewardship	   Code	   (Financial	   Reporting	  Council	   2012).	   Indeed,	   institutional	   investors	   are	   also	   expected	   to	   publically	  report	  on	  their	  policies	  on	  the	  matter	   in	  accordance	  to	  principle	   two	  of	   the	  UK	  Stewardship	   Code	   (Financial	   Reporting	   Council	   2012).	   Instead	   it	   would	   seem	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  reason	  the	  UK	  Secretary	  for	  Business	  is	  unwilling	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to	   criticize	   investors	   is	   because	   he	   acknowledges	   the	   lack	   of	   power	   that	  shareholders	  have	  had	  to	  enforce	  their	  views.	  This	  will	  change	  with	  the	  proposed	  mandatory	  and	  binding	  voting	  rights	  on	  pay.	  	  Perhaps	   this	   also	  plays	   a	   role	   in	  why	   the	  UK	   is	   not	   yet	   requiring	   shareholders	  vote	   on	   the	   ratio	   between	   the	   lowest	   and	   highest-­‐paid	   employees	   in	   the	  corporate	  and	  the	  ratio	  between	  fixed	  and	  variable	  compensation.	  In	  the	  UK	  the	  Corporate	  Governance	  Code	  is	  very	  much	  a	  voluntary	  code,	  whose	  spirit	  rather	  than	  word	  needs	  to	  be	  followed.	  A	  combination	  of	  the	  preference	  for	  a	  voluntary	  approach	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  shareholders	  have	  not	  yet	  necessarily	  had	  the	  control	  mechanisms	  to	  fully	  cohere	  with	  the	  code	  makes	  it	  unnecessary	  at	  this	  point	  to	  impose	   further	   restrictions.	   There	   seems	   still	   to	   be	   hope	   that	   the	   proposed	  changes	   will	   be	   sufficient	   to	   motivate	   shareholder	   behaviour	   in	   the	   desired	  fashion.	  	  	  Independent	   of	   these	   differences	   both	   Europe	   and	   the	   UK	   have	   drawn	   the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  voluntary	  corporate	  governance	  codes	  and	  principles	  as	  they	  stand	   have	   proven	   insufficient	   in	   driving	   desired	   behaviour	   and	   as	   such	  regulation	   is	   being	   put	   in	   place	   to	   make	   shareholder	   voting	   on	   pay	   legally	  obligatory	  to	  both	  shareholders	  and	  corporates.	  	  	  4.	   MORAL	   OBLIGATIONS	   AS	   IMPLIED	   BY	   AMENDMENTS	   TO	   DIRECTIVE	  2007/36/EC	  AND	  2013/34/EU	  	  In	   this	   section	   I	   will	   look	   at	   whether	   the	   proposed	   amendments	   to	   directive	  2007/36/EC	  and	  2013/34/EU	  should	  be	  viewed	  as	  moral	  obligations.	  To	  do	  so	  I	  first	  want	   to	   look	   closer	   at	   the	  proposed	   ratios.	   In	   section	  one	   I	   presented	   the	  two	  proposed	  ratios	  on	  which	  shareholders	  are	  expected	  to	  vote,	  one	  relating	  to	  the	  proportion	  of	  fixed	  versus	  variable	  pay	  and	  the	  other	  the	  ratio	  between	  the	  lowest	   and	   the	   highest-­‐paid	   in	   a	   corporate.	   I	   claimed	   that	   given	   that	   it	   would	  become	  legally	  mandatory	  for	  shareholders	  to	  vote	  on	  the	  two	  ratios	  they	  would	  become	  legally	  obliged	  to	  do	  so.	   	  However,	   these	  ratios	  are	  being	  proposed	  not	  only	   in	   order	   to	   increase	   shareholders	  monitoring	   of	   their	   investee	   companies	  but	   to	  also	  reduce	  what	  politicians	  view	  to	  be	  damaging	  short-­‐term	  risk	   taking	  (2014	  Press	  Release,	  European	  Commission),	  help	  tackle	  public	  anger	  over	  pay	  deals	   (2014	  Daily	  Telegraph)	  and	  curb	   the	  anger	  at	   the	  widening	  gap	  between	  earnings	  of	  bankers	  and	  business	  executives	  and	  ordinary	  workers	   (2012	   John	  O'Donnell).	   	   All	   of	   which	   go	   significantly	   beyond	   simply	   being	   asked	   to	   vote.	  Instead	  shareholders	  will	  also	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  how	  they	  vote,	  bearing	  in	  mind	  the	  changes	  that	  such	  votes	  are	  expected	  to	  have	  on	  corporate	  behaviour.	  Votes	  by	  which	  institutional	  investors	  can	  be	  judged,	  as	  they	  are	  already	  obliged	  to	  make	  both	  their	  voting	  and	  their	  policy	  on	  corporate	  governance	  issues	  public	  in	   accordance	   to	   principle	   six	   of	   the	   EFAMA	   Code	   for	   External	   Governance	  (European	  Fund	  and	  Management	  Association	  2011)	  and	  principle	  six	  of	  the	  UK	  Stewardship	  Code	  (Financial	  Reporting	  Council	  2012).	  A	  shareholder	  can	  now	  be	  judged	  to	  do	  the	  right	  or	  the	  wrong	  thing	  depending	  on	  the	  outcomes	  of	  such	  a	  vote.	   For	   this	   to	   be	   just,	   there	   needs	   to	   be	   a	   right	   or	   wrong	   outcome	   which	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shareholders	   are	   expected	   to	   achieve.	   	  And	   these	  need	   to	  be	   clearly	   known	  by	  those	  that	  are	  to	  be	  bound	  by	  them.	  	  Importantly,	   both	   the	   EFAMA	   Code	   for	   External	   Governance	   and	   the	   UK	  Stewardship	   Code	  make	   it	   clear	   that	   institutional	   investors’	   duties	   are	   to	   vote	  and	   act	   in	   the	   interests	   of	   its	   clients	   and/or	   beneficiaries.	   There	   is	   significant	  research	   looking	   at	   the	   damaging	   potential	   of	   short-­‐term	   risk	   taking	   by	  managers	  as	  well	  as	  how	  to	  better	  overcome	  agency	  issues	  by	  aligning	  managers	  interests	  with	  that	  of	  shareholders	  via	  a	  mix	  of	  monetary	  compensational	   tools	  (A.	   Smith	   1776)	   (A.	   Berle	   &	   G.	   Means	   1932).	   Such	   views	   being	   widely	   held	  amongst	  academics,	  politicians	  and	  business	  it	  is	  understandable	  why	  voting	  on	  a	  ratio	  relating	  to	  the	  proportion	  of	  fixed	  versus	  variable	  compensation	  can	  serve	  the	   purpose	   of	   looking	   after	   the	   interests	   of	   institutional	   clients	   and	  beneficiaries.	   However,	   this	   does	   not	   explain	   what	   role	   shareholders	   have	   in	  tackling	   public	   anger	   over	   pay	   deals	   if	   the	   deals	   are	   in	   fact	   in	   the	   interest	   of	  investor	  clients	  and	  beneficiaries.	   If	  not,	   then	  shareholders	  would	  now	  seem	  to	  have	  both	   a	   legal	   duty	   and	  moral	   duty	   to	   vote	   against	   a	   corporate	  proposal.	   A	  vote	   the	   corporate	   is	   now	   legally	   bound	   to	   act	   in	   accordance	   with.	   Yet	   it	   is	  unclear	  as	   to	  whether	  this	  would	  be	  a	  new	  moral	  obligation	  as	   the	  guidance	  to	  focus	  on	   such	  matters	   already	  existed	  before	   the	  proposed	  amendments.	  More	  on	  this	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  section	  six.	  But	  why	  should	  a	  vote	  on	  the	  ratio	  between	  the	  lowest	  and	  the	  highest	  paid	  in	  a	  corporate	  be	  relevant	  to	  investor	  clients	  and	  beneficiaries?	  At	  first	  glance	  it	  does	  not.	   This	   is	   an	   issue	   of	   justice	   and	   fairness	   and	   not	   corporate	   performance.	  However	  the	  idea	  is	  that	  corporates	  would	  have	  to	  justify	  managers’	  salaries	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  lowest	  paid	  and	  that	  this	  would	  should	  lead	  investors	  to	  ‘put	  a	  break	  on	  the	  annual	  upward	  pay	  ratchet’	  (2014	  The	  Daily	  Telegraph)	  Looking	  at	  numbers	   such	   as	   that	   the	   average	   FTSE100	   CEO	   is	   now	   paid	   130	   times	   the	  average	   UK	   worker	   (2013	   High	   Pay	   Centre)	   one	   can	   feel	   sympathy	   with	  politicians	   efforts	   to	   have	   corporates	   justify	   such	   differences.	   Yet,	   unless	  regulated,	   executives’	   pay	   should	   be	   based	   on	   the	   value	   they	   bring	   to	   the	  corporate	  and	  its	  shareholders.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  such	  value	  is	  best	  presented	  in	  the	   form	   of	   a	   ratio	   of	   the	   lowest	   and	   highest	   paid	   employee.	   As	   our	   codes	   of	  conduct	   stand,	   investors’	   responsibilities	   lie	   towards	   their	   clients	   and	  beneficiaries	  and	  not	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  Hence	   if	   the	  CEO’s	  are	   in	   fact	  creating	  value	   for	   a	   corporate	   worth	   such	   sums	   then	   shareholders	   should	   not	   be	  concerned	  with	  the	  multiple.	   	  Economic	   fairness	  per	  say	   is	  not	  a	  subject	   that	   is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  shareholder.	  The	  above	  in	  this	  section	  has	  been	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  matter	  in	  what	  may	  or	  may	  still	  not	  be	  a	  moral	  obligation.	  	  What	  is	  further	  important	  to	  look	  at	  is	  whether	   the	  European	  Commission	   is	   in	   itself	   in	   the	  position	   to	  either	   claim	  one	  thing	  or	  another	  to	  be	  right,	  and	  secondly	  if	  the	  commission	  has	  the	  required	  force	  that	  would	  bind	  us	  to	  act	  in	  the	  right	  way.	  Both	  of	  which	  are	  necessary	  for	  the	   subject	   matter	   to	   in	   fact	   become	   a	  moral	   obligation.	   Such	   an	   approach	   to	  moral	  obligation	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  discussed	  views	  of	  Adams	  (Adams	  1987),	  Anscombe	   (Anscombe	   1958)	   and	  Wolf	   (Wolf)	   in	   section	   2.1.	   As	   stated	   in	   that	  same	   section,	   I	   support	   that	   it	   is	   in	   virtue	   of	   societies	   demands	   that	   a	  morally	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required	  reason	  becomes	  morally	  obligatory	  (Wolf	  16:).	  	  	  To	   summarize,	  Corporate	  Governance	   frameworks	  consist	  of	   required	  codes	  of	  conduct	   and	   laws.	   The	   codes	   discussed	   in	   this	   paper	   are	   aimed	   at	   guiding	  investors’	  behavior	  both	  in	  individual	  European	  countries	  and	  across	  Europe	  as	  a	  whole.	   In	   section	   three	   I	   showed	   the	   differences	   in	   approach	   between	   the	  European	  Commission	  and	  the	  UK	  proposals.	  Were	  the	  European	  proposals	  to	  go	  through	  they	  would	  also	  apply	  to	  the	  UK	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  UK	  being	  a	  member	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  Furthermore,	  such	  codes	  and	  laws	  would	  also	  apply	  to	  non-­‐European	   owners	   of	   shares	   in	   European	   stocks.	   By	   2011	   22%	   of	   European	  Stocks	   were	   in	   fact	   owned	   by	   non-­‐European	   investors	   (OEE	   38:2012)	   and	   by	  2012	  53.2%	  of	  UK	  stocks	  were	  owned	  by	  non-­‐UK	  investors	  (Office	  for	  National	  Statistics	   1:2013).	   The	   European	   Commission,	   being	   representatives	   of	   a	  democratically	   elected	   European	   Parliament	   have	   the	   legal	   right	   to	   set	  regulations	   that	   effect	   all	   corporates	   registered	  within	   their	   borders	   and	   their	  shareholders.	   Being	   a	   representative	   of	   a	   democratically	   elected	   Government	  they	   further	   have	   the	   obligation	   to	   represent	   the	   views	   and	   needs	   of	   that	  Government’s	  people.	  Given	  that	   the	  proposed	  amendments	   to	   the	  shareholder	  directive	  are	  the	  results	  of	  significant	  consultations	  with	  representatives	  from	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  society	  I	  would	  claim	  that	  such	  proposals	  on	  the	  whole	  are	  a	  fair	  reflection	  of	  the	  views	  and	  needs	  of	  those	  people.	  Furthermore,	   its	  people	  have	  voluntarily	   accepted	   the	   European	   Union	   as	   an	   institution	   and	   society,	   as	   the	  individual	  states	  made	  a	  conscious	  choice	  whether	  to	  be	  part	  of	  this	  union	  or	  not.	  When	   doing	   so	   we,	   the	   European	   people,	   also	   accepted	   that	   there	   would	   be	  instances	  when	  the	  wider	  union	  will	  overrule	  our	  national	   interests	  and	  views.	  And	  again	  this	  is	  something	  that	  we	  as	  a	  majority	  have	  accepted	  when	  setting	  up	  the	   regulations	   for	   how	   this	   union	   should	   operate.	   As	   such	   the	   European	  Commission	  does	  have	  the	  power	  to	  impose	  moral	  obligations	  on	  us.	  	  But	   the	   question	   still	   remains	   as	   to	   whether	   these	   subject	  matters	   are	   in	   fact	  moral	  obligations	  or	  moral	  requests	  given	  that	  none	  of	  the	  European	  Corporate	  Governance	  and	  Stewardship	  codes	  are	  a:	  Rigid	  set	  of	  rules.	  It	  consists	  of	  principles	  and	  guidance.	  The	  principles	  are	  the	  core	  of	  the	  Code	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  are	  applied	  should	  be	  the	  central	   question	   for	   the	   institutional	   investor	   as	   it	   determines	   how	   to	  operate	   according	   to	   the	   Code.	   The	   guidance	   recommends	   how	   the	  principle	  might	  be	  applied	  (Financial	  reporting	  council	  4:2012).	  Perhaps	   the	  principles	  are	  not	   individually	   rigidly	   required	   to	  be	   followed,	  but	  the	   spirit	   of	   the	   code	   as	   a	   whole	   is.	   The	   moral	   obligation	   being	   that	   as	   an	  institutional	   shareholder	   your	   duty	   is	   to	   do	   right	   by	   your	   clients	   and	  beneficiaries	  irrelevant	  of	  the	  circumstances.	  And	  if	  the	  pressure	  of	  wider	  society	  or	   shareholders	   own	   conscience	   does	   not	   sufficiently	   bind	   them	   to	   act	   in	   the	  spirit	   of	   that	   code,	   then	   the	   political	   authorities	   across	   Europe	   have	   clearly	  shown	  that	  they	  are	  willing	  to	  bind	  shareholders	  to	  it	  by	  law.	  	  	  Yet,	  even	  if	  we	  agree	  that	  the	  European	  Commission	  have	  the	  required	  force	  to	  demand	  a	  given	  behavior	  or	   ‘obligatoriness’,	  we	  also	  need	   to	   look	  at	   the	  agent	  who	   is	   said	   to	   have	   a	   duty	   to	   perform	   or	   ‘the	   oblige’	   before	   drawing	   any	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conclusion	  about	  their	  responsibilities.	  The	  section	  below	  will	  therefore	  look	  at	  what	  a	  shareholder	  is.	  	  5.	  SHAREHOLDERS	  AS	  OBLIGES	  	  A	  shareholder	  is	  simply	  an	  individual,	  organization,	  or	  company	  that	  legally	  own	  share(s)	  of	  stock	  in	  a	  joint-­‐stock	  company.	  The	  below	  graph	  shows	  how	  the	  mix	  of	  the	  three	  has	  changed	  over	  the	  last	  forty	  years,	  making	  legal	  persons	  rather	  than	  purely	  natural	  persons	  the	  most	  dominant	  group	  of	  shareholders.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  INSEAD	  OEE	  DATA	  SERVICES	  2013	  Given	  that	   the	  core	  of	   the	  definition	  of	   ‘shareholder’	   involves	  a	  person	  that	  has	  entered	   a	   legal	   relationship	   with	   a	   corporate,	   the	   explanation	   to	   what	   a	  
shareholder	   is	  most	   often	   evokes	   replies	   predominantly	   focusing	   on	   the	   rights	  and	   duties	   that	   come	   with	   being	   a	   shareholder.	   The	   most	   common	   of	   those	  involving	  the	  right	  to	  receive	  dividends	  as	  determined	  by	  the	  board	  of	  directors,	  the	  right	   to	  vote	   for	  members	  of	   the	  board	  of	  directors	  and	  receiving	   their	   fair	  share	  of	  the	  residual	  value	  in	  cases	  of	  corporate	  wind	  down.	  The	  specific	  rights	  that	   shareholders	   have	   are	   further	   stated	   in	   a	   corporate’s	   articles	   of	  incorporation	  and	  bylaws	  If	  attempting	  to	  look	  at	  shareholders	  from	  an	  ontological	  perspective	  then	  what	  there	  is	  or	  what	  exist	  are	  a	  person	  (legal	  or	  natural),	  a	  corporate	  and	  a	  contract	  between	  the	  two.	  Secondly	  we	  have	  the	  most	  general	  features	  here	  being	  rights	  and	  duties	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  person	  and	  the	  corporate	  in	  which	  they	  invest.	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Because	   a	   shareholder	   is	   in	   itself	   a	   legal	   concept,	   and	   as	   the	   law	   is	   simply	   a	  collection	  of	  rights	  and	  duties,	  then	  any	  major	  changes	  in	  the	  rights	  or	  duties	  of	  shareholders	  will	  in	  fact	  redefine	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  a	  shareholder.	  As	  we	  see	  from	  the	  above	  graph	  there	  are	  already	  different	  groups	  of	  shareholders:	  households,	  investment	   funds,	   insurance	   companies	   etc.	  However,	   this	   is	  not	   simply	   saying	  the	   same	   as	   that	   there	   are	   males	   and	   females,	   both	   of	   which	   are	   human	   and	  simply	   have	   different	   physical	   characteristics.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   shareholders	   the	  different	  types	  not	  only	  have	  different	  characteristics,	  such	  as	  being	  more	  or	  less	  able	   to	   effect	   a	   corporate	   because	   of	   their	   size,	   but	   also	   come	   under	   different	  groups	  of	  rights	  and	  duties.	  As	  such	  for	  example	  the	  duties	  described	  in	  the	  UK	  Stewardship	  Code	  and	   the	  EFAMA	  Code	   for	  External	  Governance	  only	  apply	   to	  Institutional	   Shareholders.	   It	   is	   also	   this	   group	   of	   shareholders	   whom	   are	   the	  main	  target	  of	  the	  proposed	  amendments	  by	  both	  the	  European	  Commission	  and	  the	  UK	  authorities.	  For	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  paper	  I	  shall	  therefore	  differentiate	  between	   private	   shareholders	   and	   institutional	   shareholders	   when	   looking	   at	  their	  responsibilities.	  	  For	  reasons	  of	  simplification	  I	  have	  chosen	  to	  treat	  all	  institutional	  shareholders	  as	   belonging	   to	   the	   same	   group,	   although	   there	   is	   clear	   diversity	   amongst	  pension	  funds,	  mutual	  funds,	  sovereign	  funds,	  hedge	  funds	  etc.	  One	  thing	  they	  all	  do	  have	  in	  common	  and	  that	  is	  critical	  for	  my	  assessment	  is	  that	  they	  are	  all	  legal	  persons.	  As	  such	  we	  need	  to	  ask	  the	  question	  whether	  they	  can	  ever	  be	  seen	  to	  have	   moral	   obligations,	   as	   the	   traditional	   concept	   of	   a	   moral	   agent	   does	   not	  involve	   legal	   agents.	   Without	   going	   into	   a	   deeper	   discussion	   on	   the	   matter	   I	  	  	  refer	   to	   my	   paper	   titled	   Corporations	   and	   the	   sins	   of	   their	   forefathers	   (Smith	  2013)	  where	  I	  support	  List	  and	  Pettit’s	  argument	  that	  corporates	  can	  in	  fact	  be	  seen	  as	  moral	  agents.	  However,	  this	  is	  only	  true	  in	  their	  limited	  role	  as	  enactors	  of	  the	  corporates’	  deeds.	  This	  is	  where	  members’	  and	  corporates’	  responsibilities	  overlap	   and	   where	   simultaneously	   exercised	   control	   occurs.	   The	   corporate	   is	  responsible	   “given	   the	   decisions	   it	   licenses	   and	   the	   procedures	   by	   which	   it	  channels	  those	  decisions,”	  (C.	  List	  &	  P.	  Pettit.	  166:2013)	  while	  the	  members	  are	  responsible	   for	   implementing	   such	   decisions.	   Without	   such	   simultaneous	  contributions,	  no	  actions	  could	  be	  performed	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  corporate.	  This	  is	  the	  situation	  that	  occurs	  amongst	  larger	  institutional	  investors,	  where	  not	  only	  would	  there	  be	  different	  individuals	  possibly	  buying	  the	  shares,	  to	  voting	  on	  the	  corporate	  proposal	  to	  externally	  declaring	  the	  policy	  on	  which	  this	   is	  done,	  but	  all	  the	  underlying	  often	  simultaneous	  occurring	  processes	  are	  partly	  beyond	  the	  control	  of	  the	  individuals	  themselves.	  	  Given	   the	   above	   view	   on	   what	   it	   means	   to	   be	   a	   shareholder,	   and	   given	   my	  acceptance	   in	  section	   four	  regarding	   the	  European	  Commission	  and	   its	  right	   to	  impose	  moral	   demands	   the	   last	   piece	   of	   puzzle	   relates	   to	  what	   is	   required	   for	  shareholders	  to	  be	  bound	  by	  this	  specific	  demand.	  In	  section	  two	  I	  stated	  that	  my	  understanding	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  under	  the	  obligation	  to	  act	  in	  a	  given	  way	  is	  the	  following:	  Agent	  A	  is	  under	  the	  obligation	  to	  B,	  where	  to	  B	  is	  to	  act	  or	  refrain	  from	  acting	  in	  a	   given	  way,	   given	   that	   agent	   A	   exist,	   that	   there	   exists	   an	   obligation	   to	   B	   and	  furthermore	  the	  obligation	  to	  B	  necessarily	  applies	  to	  agent	  A.	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The	   following	   section	   will	   discuss	   whether	   the	   moral	   obligations	   that	   are	  indicated	  by	   the	  proposed	  amendments	   to	   the	  shareholder	   rights	  directive	  can	  truly	  be	  said	  to	  apply	  to	  shareholders.	  6.	  THE	  DEFINING	  BOND	  BETWEEN	  SHAREHOLDER	  AND	  OBLIGATION	  	  As	  it	  stands	  it	  can	  be	  said	  to	  some	  extent	  that	  a	  moral	  obligation	  goes	  beyond	  and	  agents	  will	  and	  desires,	  for	  a	  moral	  obligation	  can	  be	  forced	  upon	  an	  agent.	  If	  an	  agent	  accepts	  an	  authorities	  right	  to	  demand	  us	  to	  perform	  in	  some	  fashion	  then	  we	   may	   for	   example	   be	   obliged	   to	   not	   commit	   adultery	   simply	   because	   so	  commanded	   and	   not	   because	   we	   do	   not	   want	   to	   commit	   adultery.	   A	   stricter	  requirement	   than	  mine	  might	   claim	   that	   we	   are	   morally	   obliged	   irrelevant	   of	  whether	  we	  even	  accept	  such	  authority,	  for	  example	  God’s	  authority,	  because	  we	  remain	   under	   obligation	   simply	   by	   virtue	   of	   being	   human.	   Supporting	   either	  claim	   is	   sufficient	   to	   support	   that	   a	   moral	   obligation	   applies	   to	   an	   agent	  irrelevant	  of	  will	  and	  desires	  of	  the	  type	  mentioned	  above.	  	  	  However,	   we	   are	   not	   inclined	   to	   accept	   that	   an	   agent	   is	   morally	   obliged	   to	  perform	  a	  given	  act	  if	  they	  are	  not	  capable	  of	  doing	  so.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  whether	  an	   agent	   can	   be	   said	   to	   be	   under	   obligation	   to	   act	   in	   a	   given	  manner	   is	   partly	  determined	  by	  her	  capacity	  to	  act	  in	  that	  way.	  I	  am	  not	  here	  referring	  to	  the	  strict	  sense	  of	  control	  that	  Strawson	  (G.	  Strawson	  1:1993)	  speaks	  of	  when	  arguing	  for	  the	  basic	  case	  of	  free	  will,	  the	  central	  idea	  being	  that:	  	   1.	  Nothing	  can	  be	  causa	  sui	  -­‐	  nothing	  can	  be	  the	  cause	  of	  itself.	  	  2.	   In	   order	   to	   be	   truly	  morally	   responsible	   for	   one's	   actions	   one	  would	  have	  to	  be	  causa	  sui,	  at	  least	  in	  certain	  crucial	  mental	  respects.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3.	  Therefore	  nothing	  can	  be	  truly	  morally	  responsible.	  Instead	   I	  am	  referring	   to	  a	  simpler	   form	  of	  control.	  For	  example,	  we	  cannot	  be	  expected	  to	  vote	  if	  we	  do	  not	  have	  the	  right	  to	  vote.	  	  We	  need	  such	  rights	  in	  order	  to	  enable	  us	   to	  vote.	   It	  would	  be	  pure	  madness	   to	  claim	  that	  we	  are	  under	   the	  moral	  obligation	  to	  vote	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  citizens,	  if	  we	  did	  not	  have	  the	  right	  to	  vote.	  	  It	   is	   this	   type	   of	   control	   that	   becomes	   relevant	   when	   assessing	   whether	  shareholders	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  under	  any	  new	  moral	  obligations	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  proposed	  amendments	  to	  European	  directive	  2007/36/EC	  and	  2013/34/EU.	  By	  proposing	  that	  shareholders	  have	  mandatory	  and	  binding	  voting	  rights	  on	  pay	  it	  implies	  that	  shareholders	  can	  now,	  at	  least	  if	  part	  of	  a	  majority,	  more	  likely	  affect	  outcomes.	   I	   say	   more	   likely,	   because	   where	   as	   a	   corporate	   could	   previously	  choose	   to	  adapt	   to	   the	  wishes	  of	   shareholders	   in	   relation	   to	  pay,	   they	  are	  now	  bound	   to	  act	   in	  accordance	   to	   those	  wishes.	   In	  other	  circumstances	  corporates	  would	  not	  even	  offer	  shareholders	  the	  chance	  to	  vote	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  pay	  as	  such	  votes	   were	   not	   mandatory.	   Provided	   the	   amendments	   go	   through,	   European	  corporates	  will	  be	  legally	  obliged	  to	  have	  such	  votes	  every	  three	  years,	  provided	  that	   no	   significant	   changes	   have	   occurred	   in	   between,	   in	  which	   case	   they	  will	  have	   to	  provide	   for	  annual	  voting	  opportunities.	  This	  was	  passed	  as	   law	   in	   the	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UK	  as	  of	  October	  2013.	  	  But	   does	   this	   alter	   shareholders’	  moral	   obligations	   to	   vote	   on	   pay?	   I	   say	   no	   it	  does	  not.	  Not	   if	   the	  only	  thing	  we	  are	  actually	  wanting	  shareholders	  to	  do	   is	  to	  vote	  on	  pay.	  Then	  these	  changes	  to	  control	  are	  not	  relevant	  to	  changes	  in	  moral	  obligations.	  Previous	  to	  such	  changes,	  private	  shareholders	  had	  the	  right	  but	  not	  the	  duty	  to	  vote	  if	  a	  corporate	  chose	  to	  provide	  them	  with	  such	  opportunities.	  I	  say	  that	  they	  had	  no	  duty,	  by	  which	  I	  mean	  no	  generally	  acknowledged,	  spoken	  of	  written	  duty.	  I	  thereby	  also	  support	  the	  view	  that	  a	  moral	  obligation	  does	  not	  apply	   to	   agents	   that	   are	   unaware	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   such	   demands	   are	  made	   on	  them.	  This	  differs	  from	  institutional	  shareholders	  that	  are	  morally	  bound	  to	  vote	  by	   the	  generally	   acknowledged	  principles	  of	   the	  UK	  Stewardship	  Code	  and	   the	  EFAMA	  Code	   for	  External	  Governance.	  As	  such	   institutional	   shareholder	  would	  have	  been	  under	  the	  moral	  obligation	  to	  vote	  on	  pay,	  provided	  that	  a	  corporate	  gave	  them	  the	  opportunity	  irrelevant	  of	  any	  changes.	  They	  would	  also	  have	  been	  under	  the	  moral	  obligation	  to	  make	  their	  votes	  public.	  What	  these	  amendments	  result	  in	  is	  therefore	  changes	  to	  the	  legal	  obligation	  to	  vote	  and	  does	  not	  alter	  the	  moral	  obligations	  to	  vote	  for	  either	  type	  of	  shareholder.	  	  One	   reason	   that	   politicians	   provided	   the	   public	  with	   as	   to	   the	   reason	   to	  make	  such	  changes	  was	   to	  encourage	   further	  engagement	  between	  shareholders	  and	  corporates	   as	   they	   were	   seen	   not	   to	   sufficiently	   monitor	   the	   companies	   they	  invested	   in	   (2014	   Press	   Release,	   European	   Commission).	   Again,	   if	   increased	  engagement	   and	   monitoring	   is	   simply	   defined	   by	   voting	   on	   pay,	   then	   again	  nothing	  has	  changed	  out	  of	  a	  moral	  perspective	  for	  either	  type	  of	  shareholder	  as	  per	  above.	  That	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  there	  will	  not	  be	  an	  increase	  in	  engagement	  or	  monitoring,	   for	   there	   clearly	   will	   be,	   simply	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   threat	   of	   legal	  punishment	  that	  comes	  with	  legal	  obligation.	  	  However,	   there	  are	  other	  ways	   in	  which	  to	  measure	  engagement	  and	  sufficient	  monitoring	   beyond	   direct	   voting	   participation.	   Corporate	   boards	   are	   generally	  inclined	   not	   to	   want	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   proposing	   anything	   that	   goes	   against	   the	  interest	  of	  shareholders.	  Partly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  reputation,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  the	  shareholders	  that	  vote	  for	  who	  sits	  on	  the	  board.	  But	  also,	  because	  they	  are	  seen	  as	   being	   under	   the	   moral	   obligation	   themselves	   to	   act	   in	   the	   interest	   of	  shareholders,	   which	   is	   supported	   by	   both	   the	   UK	   Corporate	   Governance	   Code	  (Financial	  Reporting	  Council	  11:2014)	  that	  states	  that:	  	  The	  board	  should	  set	  the	  company’s	  values	  and	  standards	  and	  ensure	  that	  its	  obligations	  to	  its	  shareholders	  and	  others	  are	  understood	  and	  met.	  The	  OECD	  Principles	   for	   Corporate	  Governance	   (OECD	  26:2004)	   further	   states	  that:	   Board	  members	  should	  act	  on	  a	  fully	  informed	  basis,	  in	  good	  faith,	  with	  due	  diligence	  and	  care,	  and	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  the	  company	  and	  the	  shareholders.	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As	   such	   the	   proposed	   amendments	   of	   the	   European	   Shareholders	   Rights	  directive	  do	  give	  a	  control	  to	  shareholders	  beyond	  that	  of	  simply	  mandatory	  and	  binding	   voting	   rights.	   However,	   such	   additional	   control	   only	   truly	   relates	   to	  institutional	   and	   other	   major	   shareholders	   for	   it	   is	   these	   with	   whom	  management	   will	   want	   to	   increase	   their	   engagement	   with,	   in	   order	   to	   ensure	  that	   the	  proposals	  are	  accepted.	  This	   control	   relates	   to	  having	  more	   input	   into	  the	   process	   of	   deciding	   on	   what	   the	   actual	   proposal	   on	   pay	   will	   be.	   Yet	   the	  increase	  in	  such	  control	  comes	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  duties.	  This	  is	  a	  least	  true	  for	  institutional	  shareholders,	  who	  are	  morally	  obliged	  by	  the	  stewardship	  codes	  to	  act	   in	   the	   interest	   of	   their	   clients	   and	   beneficiaries.	   Institutional	   shareholders	  will	  now	  be	  seen	  as	  having	  a	  greater	  impact	  on	  the	  proposals	  themselves	  and	  as	  such	  have	  the	  obligation	  to	  ensure	  that	  these	  are	   in	  the	   interest	  of	   their	  clients	  and	  beneficiaries.	  For	  major	  private	  shareholders	  it	  may	  simply	  be	  the	  case	  that	  it	   is	   sufficient	   that	   the	   authorities	   have	   expressed	   their	   moral	   demand	   for	  increased	   engagement	   with	   corporates	   and	   that	   this	   change	   to	   legislation	  enables	  them	  to	  do	  it	  for	  such	  moral	  demands	  to	  apply	  to	  them.	  	  6.1	  THE	  GOLDEN	  RATIOS	  Let	   us	   now	   turn	   to	   the	   two	   specific	   ratios	   proposed	   by	   the	   European	  Commission;	  the	  ratio	  between	  the	  fixed	  and	  variable	  parts	  of	  the	  remuneration	  and	   the	   ratio	   between	   the	   lowest	   and	   highest	   paid	   in	   the	   corporate.	   As	   no	  shareholder	  has	  previously	  been	  presumed	  to	  be	   in	  a	  position	  to	  vote	  on	  these	  matters	  there	  cannot	  be	  any	  change	  to	  previous	  moral	  obligations.	  This	  is	  at	  least	  the	  case	  when	  referring	  to	  the	  voting	  itself.	  However,	  what	  other	  kind	  of	  act	  may	  the	  authorities	  wish	  to	  promote	  by	  legislating	  mandatory	  and	  binding	  voting	  on	  these	  two	  ratios?	  As	  discussed	  in	  section	  four	  what	  politicians	  are	  further	  hoping	  to	   promote	   is	   a	   decrease	   to	   short-­‐term	   risk	   taking	   (2014	   Press	   Release,	  European	  Commission	  ),	  and	  help	  tackling	  the	  widening	  gap	  between	  earnings	  of	  bankers	  and	  business	  executives	  and	  ordinary	  workers	  (2012	  John	  O'Donnell).	  Firstly,	  I	  would	  claim	  that	  smaller	  private	  shareholders	  would	  again	  not	  be	  able	  to	   have	   any	   control	   on	   these	  matters	   beyond	   casting	   their	   vote.	   As	   such	   they	  have	  no	  further	  obligations	  of	  any	  form.	  However,	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  reduction	  of	  short-­‐term	  risk	  taking	  amongst	  managers	  can	  potentially	  be	  achieved	  by	  altering	  the	  fixed	  and	  variable	  parts	  of	  the	  remuneration	  ratio.	  It	  is	  again	  also	  true	  that	  by	  legally	  requiring	  a	  mandatory	  and	  binding	  vote	  on	  this	  ratio	  boards	  will	  be	  more	  inclined	   to	   engage	   with	   larger	   shareholders	   providing	   them	   with	   greater	   say.	  However,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   whether	   institutional	   shareholders	   would	   always	   be	  looking	  after	  their	  clients’	  and	  beneficiaries’	  best	  interests,	  as	  demanded	  by	  the	  stewardship	   codes,	   if	   doing	   so.	   This	   is	   because	   not	   all	   clients	   or	   beneficiaries	  wish	   to	   invest	   for	   the	   long-­‐term.	   Where	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case	   the	   demand	   on	  institutional	  shareholders	  to	  reduce	  short-­‐term	  risk	  taking,	  and	  thereby	  possibly	  reduce	   higher	   short-­‐term	   share	   performance,	   may	   directly	   conflict	   with	   the	  obligations	  they	  already	  have	  towards	  their	  clients	  and	  beneficiaries.	  Authorities	  could	  potentially	  counter	  this	  by	  demanding	  that	  any	  short-­‐term	  rewards	  should	  not	   come	   at	   the	   cost	   of	   long-­‐term	   interests.	   Institutional	   shareholders	   would	  then	  have	  to	  find	  other	  ways	  to	  satisfy	  the	  needs	  of	  short-­‐term	  investors	  that	  did	  not	   involve	   increasing	   short-­‐term	  risk	   taking	  within	   corporates.	  But	   this	   is	  not	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something	   that	   has	   been	   sufficiently	   expressed	   by	   the	   authorities	   nor	   been	  consulted	  on.	  Therefor	  as	  things	  stand	  one	  moral	  obligation	  may	  directly	  conflict	  with	  another.	   It	   is	  not	  clear	  whether	   the	  moral	  obligation	  to	  reduce	  short-­‐term	  risk	  within	  corporates	  should	  apply	  more	  dominantly	  to	  shareholders	  than	  their	  current	   moral	   obligation	   to	   their	   clients	   and	   beneficiaries.	   	   Institutional	  shareholders	   current	   moral	   obligations	   are	   towards	   clients,	   beneficiaries	   and	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  Their	  current	  clients	  and	  beneficiaries	  have	  chosen	  to	  invest	  with	   them	   partly	   in	   light	   of	   these	   obligations	   and	   the	   duties	   that	   result	   from	  them.	   As	   such	   institutional	   investors	   cannot	   simply	   choose	   to	   violate	   their	  current	  obligations	  without	  their	  clients	  and	  beneficiaries	  acceptance.	  If	  they	  do	  not	   agree	   to	   such	   violations	   then	   they	   have	   a	   basis	   for	   complaint	   against	   the	  institutional	   shareholders.	   This	   is	   the	   type	   of	   argument	   that	   Gilbert	   (Gilbert	  11.1999)	   uses	   when	   comparing	   a	   moral	   obligation	   to	   a	   promise.	   If	   the	  authorities,	   however,	   demand	   that	   institutional	   shareholders	   put	   another	  obligation	   above	   their	   current	   one,	   then	   they	   cannot	   be	   blamed,	   for	   such	   a	  decision	  would	  be	  out	  of	  their	  control.	  The	   proposed	   voting	   on	   the	   ratio	   between	   the	   lowest	   and	   highest	   paid	   in	   the	  corporate	   could	   have	   an	   even	   more	   profound	   effect	   on	   institutional	  shareholders.	   For	   institutional	   shareholders	   to	   engage	   with	   management	   in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  earnings	  gap	  in	  a	  corporate	  it	  would	  have	  to	  be	  shown	  that	  this	  is	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  their	  investors.	  However,	  there	  is	  very	  little	  to	  show	  that	  such	  an	  improvement	  in	  justice	  either	  generates	  higher	  equity	  returns	  or	  higher	  efficiency	   within	   corporates	   (M.	   Conyon	   &	   K.	   Murphy	   2000).	   Furthermore,	   a	  2013	  paper	  published	  in	  the	  Journal	  of	  Banking	  and	  Finance,	  ‘The	  Determinants	  and	  Effects	  of	  CEO-­‐Employee	  Pay	  Ratios,’	  	  (O.	  Faleye;	  E.	  Reis	  &	  A.	  Venkateswaran	  2013)	   looked	   at	   the	   relationship	   between	   relative	   pay	   and	   employee	  productivity.	   The	   study	   found	   no	   statistical	   significance	   in	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	   pay	   ratio	   and	   firm	   productivity.	   In	   fact	   they	   found	   that	   the	   firm	  value	   actually	   increases	   with	   increased	   relative	   pay	   for	   CEOs.	   A	   one	   standard	  deviation	  increase	  in	  the	  ratio	  meant	  a	  5.3%	  increase	  in	  the	  firm	  value.	  Operating	  performance	  also	  increased	  with	  relative	  CEO	  pay.	  What	   institutional	   investors	  are	  obliged	   to	  do	   is	   to	  ensure	   that	  management	   is	  not	   paid	   more	   than	   they	   deserve.	   A	   large	   multiple	   between	   the	   CEO	   and	   the	  average	  worker	  may	  throw	  up	  some	  questions	  and	  force	  the	  corporate	  to	  further	  justify	  the	  wage	  package.	  However,	  if	  the	  institutional	  shareholders	  then	  accept	  this	  justification,	  then	  it	  should	  not	  be	  their	  role	  to	  push	  through	  a	  change	  on	  the	  basis	   of	   other	   societal	   values	   of	   justice.	   If	   the	   European	   Commission	  wants	   to	  make	  institutional	  shareholders	  bound	  to	  drive	  such	  change,	  then	  this	  is	  a	  major	  transition	   in	   morality,	   and	   would	   force	   us	   to	   redefine	   what	   it	   is	   to	   be	   an	  institutional	  shareholder.	  If	  not,	  then	  such	  a	  moral	  obligation	  cannot	  apply	  to	  the	  current	  definition	  of	  shareholders.	  7.	  CONCLUSION	  	  This	   paper	   sets	   out	   to	   look	   at	   whether	   changes	   to	   the	   European	   Commission	  Shareholder	   Rights	  Directive	   on	   pay	   alter	   shareholders’	  moral	   responsibilities.	  Moral	   responsibilities	   are	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   shareholder’s	   being	   under	   the	   moral	  obligation	  to	  act	  or	  refrain	  from	  acting	  in	  a	  given	  way.	  The	  proposed	  changes	  to	  
	   18	  
















	   19	  
Bibliography	  R.	  M.	  Adams	  (1987)	  ’Divine	  Commands	  and	  the	  social	  nature	  of	  obligation’	  	  G.	  E.	  M.	  Anscombe	  (1958)	  ‘Modern	  Moral	  Philosophy’	  Philosophy	  33	  No	  124.	  	  M.	  Conyon	  &	  K.	  Murphy	  (2000)	  ‘The	  prince	  and	  the	  pauper?	  CEO	  pay	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  United	  Kingdom’	  The	  Economic	  Journal	  110,	  Royal	  Economic	  Society	  	  Berle,	  A.	  &	  Means,	  G.	  (1932)	  The	  modern	  corporation	  and	  private	  property.	  New	  York:	  Macmillan.	  	  O.	  Faleye,	  E.	  Reis	  &	  A.	  Venkateswaran	  (2013)	  The	  Determinants	  and	  Effects	  of	  CEO-­‐Employee	  Pay	  Ratios,”	  Journal	  of	  Banking	  and	  Finance,	  Vol.	  37:	  3258-­‐3272	  M.	  Friedman	  (13th	  Sept	  1970).	  ‘The	  Social	  Responsibility	  of	  Business	  is	  to	  Increase	  its	  Profits’	  The	  
New	  York	  Times	  Magazine	  	  M.	  Gilbert	  (1999)	  ‘Obligation	  and	  Joint	  Commitment’	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press	  C.	  List	  &	  P.	  Pettit.	  (2013)	  Group	  Agency	  –	  The	  Possibility,	  Design,	  and	  Status	  of	  Corporate	  Agents.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  T.	  Pink	  (Dec	  6,	  2002)	  ‘Moral	  Obligation’	  Royal	  Institute	  Lecture	  	  A.	   Smith	   (1977)	   [1776].	   An	   Inquiry	   into	   the	   Nature	   and	   Causes	   of	   the	   Wealth	   of	   Nations.	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  	  G.	  Strawson	  (1994)	  ‘The	  impossibility	  of	  Moral	  Responsibility’	  Philosophical	  Studies	  75:	  5-­‐24,	  Kluwer	  Academic	  Publishers	  R.	  Zimmerman	  (1996).	  The	  Law	  of	  Obligations:	  Roman	  Foundations	  of	  the	  Civilian	  Tradition:	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  	  S.	  Wolf	  (2009)’	  Moral	  Obligations	  and	  Social	  Commands’	  University	  of	  Carolina	  	  
	  
Other	  References	  John	  O'Donnell	  (16th	  of	  May,	  2012)	  EU's	  ‘Barnier	  urges	  binding	  shareholder	  vote	  on	  pay’	  Reuters	  	  E.	  B.	  Smith	  &	  P.	  Kuntz	  (Apr	  30,	  2013)	  ‘CEO	  Pay	  1,795-­‐to-­‐1	  Multiple	  of	  Wages	  Skirts	  U.S.	  Law’	  Bloomberg	  News	  	  S.	  Tolley.	  (22	  March	  2012)	  ‘Cable	  wants	  shareholders	  to	  get	  the	  final	  say	  on	  pay’	  Money	  Marketing	  (2004)‘OECD	  Principles	  of	  Corporate	  Governance’	  OECD	  (April	  2011)	  EFAMA	  Code	  for	  external	  governance	  ‘Principles	  for	  the	  exercise	  of	  ownership	  rights	  in	  investee	  companies’	  EFAMA	  (2012)	  ‘Under	  that	  tender:	  Who	  Owns	  the	  European	  Economy?	  Evolution	  of	  the	  Owenership	  of	  EU-­‐listed	  companies	  between	  1970	  and	  2012’	  Observatoire	  De	  L’Epargne	  Europeen.	  Paris,	  France (Sept	  2012)	  ‘The	  UK	  Stewardship	  Code’	  Financial	  reporting	  Council	  	  (Sept	  2014)	  ‘The	  UK	  Corporate	  Governance	  Code’	  Financial	  reporting	  Council	  	  	  
	   20	  
(March	  2012)	  ‘Shareholder	  voting	  rights	  consultation’	  Department	  for	  Business	  Innovation	  and	  Skills	  	  (2013)	  ‘FTSE	  100	  CEO	  pay	  briefing	  2013	  –	  Have	  new	  rules	  on	  top	  pay	  had	  any	  impact?’	  High	  Pay	  Centre	  (9th	  of	  April	  2014)	  ‘COM(2014)	  213	  final’	  European	  Commission	  	  	  (9th	  of	  April	  2014)	  ‘European	  Commission	  proposes	  to	  strengthen	  shareholder	  engagement	  and	  introduce	  a	  "say	  on	  pay"	  for	  Europe’s	  largest	  companies’	  Press	  Release,	  European	  Commission.	  	  (March	  2014)	  ‘EU	  Bankers'	  Bonuses’	  Financial	  Times	  (Friday	  14th	  Nov	  2014)	  ‘Cable	  gives	  shareholders	  greater	  say	  over	  executive	  pay’	  The	  Daily	  Telegraph	  	  
